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This paper examines the impact of the introduction of market forces on the provision of 
childcare in the Netherlands. In January 2005, the Dutch government introduced the Childcare 
Act which replaced the former financing system which had elements of both supply- and 
demand-financing with a fully demand-financing system. Whereas previously public funds 
partly flowed to suppliers in the form of subsidies granted by local municipalities, they now 
flow exclusively to parents who are free to choose their childcare provider. This reform was 
intended to stimulate market forces in the market for childcare. The change in the financing 
system may have also had an effect on the playing field between not-for-profit and for-profit 
childcare providers, as there are theoretical arguments for why municipalities might have given 
preferential treatment to not-for-profit providers when granting childcare subsidies. We 
compare the provision of childcare in the Netherlands under the old regime (in the period 1999-
2001) to the provision of childcare after the introduction of the Childcare Act (in 2006). We 
find that there has been a marked change in where childcare providers locate. Compared to the 
period 1999-2001, the provision of childcare in 2006 has shifted towards areas with higher 
purchasing power and away from less urbanised areas. In addition, we find that the share of for-
profit providers expanded dramatically, while most of the contraction in childcare provision 
occurred in low-demand markets which were formerly solely occupied by not-for-profit centres. 
We discuss the policy implications of these results. 
 
1 We would like to thank Paul de Bijl, Pierre Koning, Aad van Tongeren, Raymond Gradus, Thomas Rietbergen and Jelte 
Theisens for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
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1  Introduction 
The market for childcare is subject to a large range of regulations that aim to guarantee high-
quality, affordable and accessible childcare for all. There are several rationales for government 
intervention in the childcare market. One rationale arises due to the information asymmetry on 
quality between consumers and childcare providers. Parents cannot fully assess the quality of 
care given to their children. Mocan (2001) for instance finds that parents tend to overrate 
quality compared to professional observers. As a consequence, childcare providers may exploit 
the information asymmetry by shirking on quality in order to increase profits (Mocan, 2001; 
Morris and Helburn, 2000). Another rationale for government intervention is the externality 
created on the labour market, as the availability of childcare may serve to enhance women’s 
participation on the labour market and consequently increase the tax base.
2 Finally, 
distributional concerns often play a role in childcare. The government may for instance want to 
guarantee a minimum provision of childcare and affordable services for all.  
 
Due to these public concerns, many governments have been hesitant to allow private for-profit 
(FP) provision of childcare and have instead opted for public provision in an attempt to 
guarantee the highest possible level of control over quality, affordability and accessibility. In 
Denmark, France and Sweden, for instance, provision of childcare is the exclusive domain of 
public organisations. Germany, Italy and Spain allow instead for private not-for-profit (NFP) 
provision of childcare next to public provision. Since public provision may suffer from 
inefficiencies, another option is to leave the provision of childcare to private childcare centres 
and to guarantee quality and accessibility through generic regulations, in the form of minimum 
quality standards and target-group subsidies. This is the option chosen by most Anglo-Saxon 
countries, which allow private FP childcare centres to operate next to public and NFP centres.  
 
In this respect, the Dutch market for childcare stands out as one of the few countries without 
public provision of childcare. Only private FP and NFP providers operate and compete in this 
market. In 2004, about 60% of the 1,300 Dutch childcare organisations had a FP status and 40% 
a NFP one (van der Kemp and Kloosterman, 2005). Most of the largest organisations - with 
more than 10 centres - were NFP organisations. There is evidence that in some municipalities, 
local governments may have favoured NFPs as recipients of public subsidies, for example 
because it was felt that they could better serve public interests. As a result, FP and NFPs 
organisations were not always competing on a level playing field. In January 2005, the Dutch 
government implemented a major reform with the introduction of the Childcare Act. One of the 
 
2 There is substantial literature looking at the impact of childcare on women’s labour participation, see Blau and Currie 
(2004) for a review of the evidence.   3 
main changes is that the demand for childcare is subsidised instead of the supply of childcare. 
This new financing structure had two main consequences. Firstly, it allowed parents to freely 
choose their childcare provider. Secondly, in as far as NFP childcare providers were favoured 
by municipalities under the old regime, it removed this advantage and levelled the playing field 
between FP and NFP providers. 
 
Using data on the geographical location of childcare centres, we 1) compare the provision of 
childcare prior to the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act to the provision after the 
introduction of the act; and 2) analyse changes in the provision of childcare by FP and NFP 
childcare centres. In the first part of the analysis, we look at whether there has been a significant 
change in where childcare facilities are located. We find that growth in the provision of 
childcare has predominantly occurred in markets with higher purchasing power and in more 
urbanised areas. In the second part of the analysis, we look at whether there has been a change 
in where FP and NFP childcare providers locate. We find evidence of a greater presence of FP 
providers in many markets and a marked decline of the number of NFP providers.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 first describes the reform introduced by the 2005 
Childcare Act. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework of our analysis and the related 
literature. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, 
Section 6 discusses the policy implications of our study and concludes. 
2  The market for childcare in the Netherlands 
The use of formal childcare in the Netherlands has long lagged behind the use in other 
countries. For instance, in 1990 only 2% of children aged 0-13 used formal day care 
arrangements. Even though this figure increased to 12% in 2004, this is still far lower than in 
Scandinavian countries, where enrolment is close to 80%. The low enrolment rate in the 
Netherlands has mainly been attributed to the low participation of women on the labour market 
and a traditional preference for informal day care, in which children are taken care of by 
parents, relatives and friends. 
 
In order to stimulate the use of childcare and thereby women’s participation in the labour 
market, the Dutch government took a large range of initiatives over the last decade to 
professionalize and expand the capacity of the childcare market. At the same time, the 
government aimed to shift an increasing part of the costs of childcare provision from the 
government towards firms and households. In this respect, the Dutch provision of childcare has 
been qualified as being in between the state and the market, or, stated differently, between the   4 
Swedish government solution and the US market solution (Dobbelsteen et al (2000)). Prior to 
the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act, three types of childcare places existed: those 
purchased by local municipalities (so-called subsidised places), those purchased by firms, i.e. 
parents’ employers (so-called company places) and places purchased by parents (denoted as 
private places). With subsidised places, the local municipality acted as an intermediary by 
purchasing the childcare place from the childcare provider and subsequently making it available 
to parents. Parents who had access to childcare through these subsidised places paid an income-
related fee, according to a recommended national fee scale. The remainder of the day-care costs 
was then borne by the local community. Subsidised places were prevalent: Bressers et al (2006) 
estimate that in 2004 approximately 70% of all childcare organisations offered some subsidised 
places.
3 Day-care costs borne by parents’ employers were subsidised by the state as firms were 
allowed to subtract 30% of their costs from payroll taxes. Parents who bought places directly 
(private places) could also deduct a fraction of their day-care costs from their taxable income. In 
the last decade, the government has been particularly successful in stimulating the participation 
of firms in childcare costs. While in 1996, 46% of child places were bought by firms, 38% by 




A major reform of the Dutch childcare market took place in January 2005 with the introduction 
of the Childcare Act. The provision of childcare became fully market-driven as all elements of 
supply financing, notably the purchase of subsidised places by local municipalities, were 
removed. In the new financing structure, all subsidies directly flow to the demand side, i.e. the 
parents, and not the supply side. All parents are now free to choose their childcare provider and 
sign a contract directly with the day-care centre. Depending on their income, parents can qualify 
for a government reimbursement of part of their childcare costs.
5 Initially, the employers of 
both parents were encouraged to bear part of the cost of childcare as they could fund up to a 
maximum of one-third of total childcare costs tax free. As of January 2007, the financial 
contribution of employers has become mandatory.  
 
With the introduction of demand-financing, the 2005 Childcare Act also changed the role of 
local communities in the childcare market. Prior to the introduction of the Childcare Act, 
municipalities played an important role in shaping the local childcare provision through the 
purchase of subsidised places as they could decide with which childcare provide to contract and 
 
3 Bressers et al (2006) also find that on average, 1-30% of the places provided by an organisation were subsidised places. 
4 Statline (27-11-2006), Statistics Netherlands. 
5 The deduction from personal income tax for parents has been abolished.   5 
could fix the requirements for granting subsidies.
6 There is evidence that in practice, NFP 
‘welfare’ organisations were favoured in the contracting process with local municipalities. One 
of the motives behind the preference was the belief that NFP organisations offer more 
guarantees that the subsidy will be spend on welfare-related issues. For instance, the decree on 
subsidy funding of the municipality of Hengelo stated that “not-for-profit organisations present 
by definition a guarantee that the subsidy funds would be spent to pursue the objective for 
which they were issued”.
7 This type of preference might have been especially common in small 
municipalities. By removing these subsidy relationships, an important consequence of the 2005 
Childcare Act would thus be a levelling of the playing field between FP and NFP organisations 
as NFP centres now have to compete at equal arms with FP childcare centres.  
 
These recent developments show the increasing role of market forces in the provision of 
childcare in the Netherlands. However, the government still retains an active role in the market 
for childcare by subsidising demand. By granting larger subsidies to low-income groups, the 
government aims to guarantee financial accessibility to childcare. Quality also remains highly 
regulated through strict minimum quality standards. One of the main tasks of local communities 
is now to monitor the quality of childcare centres. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss the 
changes in the provision of childcare that have accompanied these institutional changes.  
3  Related literature and discussion 
A first consequence of the 2005 Childcare Act is that public officials at the local municipality 
level have lost some control over the provision of childcare. Before 2005, only part of the 
provision of childcare was affected by demand factors, notably through parents directly buying 
private places. The other part was determined by political factors. The local council was in 
charge of deciding how much to invest in the availability of childcare facilities. To a certain 
extent, political parties also want to fulfil the expectations of their votes in order to be re-elected 
(Maskin and Tirole (2004)). Van Dijk et al. (1993) estimate the factors affecting the supply of 
childcare by Dutch municipalities in 1993. They find that the decision to invest in childcare 
provision was positively affected by the percentage of left-wing council members as well as by 
the proportion of women in the council. Similar results were found in other countries such as 
Sweden (Gustavson and Stafford (1992)) where provision was entirely determined by public 
officials. The conclusion of van Dijk et al. (1993) is that although demand factors, such as 
 
6 Local communities could also choose to assign the childcare places they bought to certain groups of parents. Certain local 
communities for instance favoured special target groups, such as parents from low-income families, or used to condition the 
access to these places on whether parents received a contribution from their employer.  
7 General decree on conditions for subsidy funding, Article 1, Hengelo community.    6 
income and the number of pre-school children in the market played a role, political factors 
matter as well.  
 
In the new demand-financing system, political factors are not relevant anymore in determining 
the provision of childcare in a market.
8 Instead, demand factors are expected to explain a 
greater part of the provision of childcare after the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act than 
before. Incentives for childcare centres have shifted. While childcare centres formerly had 
incentives to establish new centres in markets where public officials were especially willing to 
invest in childcare and thereby buy large amounts of subsidised places, this is no longer the case 
under the new regime. Now, childcare organisations have incentives to open facilities in 
markets where the demand is high. The empirical literature identifies the following factors as 
positively affecting demand in the local childcare market: income, size of municipality, number 
of pre-school children and female activity (Gonzalez and Vidal (2006) and Kjulin (1995). This 
sparked some concerns in the run-up to the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act about the 
effect of the new system on the accessibility of childcare. For example, one commentator noted 
that “The financing system of the Basic Childcare Provisions Act (WBK) is oriented to enabling 
parents with little spending power also to be able to make use of day-care for children. Time 
after time we hear the lectures given by the state secretary Margo Vliegenthart stressing the 
importance of backing demand with buying power, also in deprived areas. Theoretically, this is 
actually how the financing system is structured, and, indeed parents with less income receive a 
higher financial contribution from the government to fund their day-care for children. 
Nonetheless, it would appear less than probable that entrepreneurs in day-care for children will 
feel inspired to set up business in the poorer neighbourhoods or in country areas, where they 
will be less assured of a flow of customers (idealists excepted). Offering services in a wealthy 




Another implication of the 2005 Childcare Act is that it ended the subsidy relationships between 
municipalities and childcare providers. There are theoretical arguments why municipalities my 
have preferred NFP childcare organisations as the supplier of subsidised childcare places prior 
to the introduction of the act. We have no evidence of this systematically being the case, but 
there are some records of individual municipalities favouring NFPs, e.g. the municipality of 
Hengelo (see section 2). Theoretically, NFPs may be better able to defend public concerns than 
FPs, which would support the preferential treatment of NFP suppliers. One of the main 
 
8 With the understanding that the government retains an active role in regulating the childcare sector. 
9 The Basic Childcare Provisions Act (WBK) by Liesbeth Schreuder, Netherlands Institute for Care and Welfare (NIZW), 
available from http://www.kenniscentrum-ouderen.nl/Youthpolicy/docs/word/BasicChildcareProvisionsAct.doc 
   7 
arguments is that NFPs can ‘make a difference’, i.e. outperform FPs, on several important 
aspects, notably quality and accessibility.  
 
The theoretical advantage of NFPs comes from the fact that they can attract extra rents, mainly 
in the form of donated labour (Yong and Grout (2003) and Hansmann (1980)). Indeed, one of 
the key characteristics of NFPs is that they are subject to a non-redistribution constraint. In 
other words, they have to reinvest all their surpluses in the spirit of the organisation’s mission. 
Due to this constraint, NFPs are able to attract donated labour from their employees. This 
means that employees will be willing to provide effort beyond the level explicitly contracted. 
They are willing to ‘go the extra mile’ because they know that their efforts will be spend on the 
organisation’s mission and not redistributed as profits to shareholders. Because of their 
preference away from profit-maximisation, NFPs can thus benefit from a cost advantage, 
produce at lower marginal costs and therefore outperform FPs (Lakdawalla and Philipson 
(1998)).  
 
Empirical evidence on whether NFPs actually ‘make a difference’ in the childcare sector is 
rather mixed.
10 While some Canadian studies do find that NFPs provide higher quality than FPs 
(Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004) and Japel et al. (2005)), many other US studies do not 
(Morris and Helburn (2000) and Blau and Mocan (2002)). The same mixed evidence holds for 
studies looking at whether NFPs are better able to guarantee accessibility to special target 
groups. On one side, some studies find that NFP childcare organisations are more likely to serve 
low-income families (Cleveland and Krashinsky (2005); Morris and Helburn (2000) and Blau 
and Mocan (2002)). On the other side, other studies find that NFPs are at the same time more 
likely to attract children from high-income families (Whitebook et al. (1990)). Strikingly, the 
study by Japel et al. (2005) find that children from low-income families are more likely to 
attend FP day care centres.  
 
While there are some arguments why public officials may want to favour NFPs organisations, 
in practice NFPs do not seem to perform better than FPs.
11 One of the reason why NFPs may 
not make a difference is that they may suffer from inefficiencies. In other words, the rents from 
donated labour may be lost in inefficiencies, such as an unclear mission, high wages, a lack of 
solid financial management, etc. The Canadian and US evidence in the childcare market show 
that NFPs tend to offer higher wages than FPs (Mocan (1995), Mocan and Terkin (2000), Blau 
and Mocan (2002) and Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004)). Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004) 
argue, however, that this does not hold anymore once quality differences are corrected for. 
 
10 In the Appendix, we include a more extensive literature review of the childcare market. 
11 There are also other arguments why policies aiming to favour NFPs organisations are not always appropriate. See Koning 
et al (2007).    8 
Mocan (1995) and Blau and Mocan (2002) find no cost- or efficiency differences between FPs 
and NFPs in the childcare sector.  
 
Regarding the effect of the 2005 Childcare Act, a question that arises is whether NFPs and FPs 
respond in the same way to both growth and decline in demand. According to the theoretical 
model by Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998), because NFPs can produce at lower marginal costs, 
NFPs would be less responsive to demand reductions and be quicker to enter in response to 
demand growth. In other words, they would be better able than FPs to survive in less profitable 
markets. Empirical evidence - available only on hospitals - however, often show the opposite.  
Hansmann et al (2002) find that FPs hospitals adjust their capacity more responsively to 
demand reductions than public or NFPs hospitals. Chakravarty et al (2005) find that FP 
hospitals have higher entry and exit rates than NFPs, suggesting that FPs were more responsive 
to both growth and decline in demand. To explain these results, Chakravarty et al (2005) argue 
that financial factors, such as the ability to invest and raise capital, might impede the growth of 
NFPs.  
 
Anecdotal evidence in the Dutch childcare market suggests that NFPs may experience more 
difficulties surviving in the new market conditions created by the 2005 Childcare Act. A study 
by PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2005) suggests that the introduction of market forces over the 
1990s has had a larger impact on childcare organisations with a welfare-tradition than on the 
ones which already had a market orientation. Indeed, financial analysis of welfare childcare 
organisations shows that they were often not profitable without subsidies, lacked solid financial 
controls and the capacity to raise capital. 
4  Data   
In order to investigate whether there has been a change in the pattern of childcare provision and 
in particular a change in childcare provision by NFPs and FPs, we use data from the General 
Firm Registry
12 on the location (i.e. postal code and street number) and profit status of childcare 
facilities as registered by the Chamber of Commerce. We define the relevant local market for 
the childcare provider as the 4-digit postal code area in which it operates, as parents in general 
do not want to take their children to a facility that is located too far from their home.
13 Total 
childcare provision per market is calculated as the total number of facilities offering childcare 
 
12 In Dutch: “Het Algemeen Bedrijfsregister”. The results presented in this paper are own calculations on the basis of a 
dataset that was made available by Statistics Netherlands. 
13 According to the director of Catalpa, the largest childcare provider in the Netherlands (in a recent interview in Het 
Financieele Dagblad, 22-9-2006) chances that parents take their child to a facility decrease by 20% per kilometre distance 
from their home.    9 
per postal code. In total, there are some 3,970 postal code areas (and by our definition therefore 
an equal number of potential markets for childcare) in the Netherlands. We compare the 
childcare provision in the period 1999-2001 to the childcare provision in 2006 and so compare 
the provision of childcare in a period prior to the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act to the 
childcare provision under the new regime.
14 We exclude the postal codes with childcare 
provision in neither period (i.e. markets with no childcare facility in 1999-2001 and no 
childcare facility in 2006), which constitute a large portion of all potential markets 
(approximately 40%). The underlying idea is that these markets are too small to sustain any 
childcare provider and therefore are not considered as (viable) markets for childcare. We also 
exclude markets with 100 inhabitants or less.
15 In total this leaves us with just over of 2,450 
local childcare markets. A slight drawback of the dataset is that it suffers from missing 
observations and may therefore not be fully representative of the entire population of Dutch 
childcare facilities. Where possible, we have compared our results to those reported in other 
studies and found them to be in line. In addition, we can establish that the dataset contains a 
sizeable portion of the total population of childcare facilities in the Netherlands.
16 This should 
therefore enable us to capture the general trends in the market.  
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14 We use the average over 1999-2001 rather than just the year 1999 to correct for any errors in the data. We don’t use this 
technique at the end of the period as the year 2005 is to be considered a transitional year due to the introduction of the 2005 
Childcare Act. The act was first proposed in late 2001 and was originally intended to enter into force in 2003 (see Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001–2002, 26587, nr. 17).  
15 In total, this further excludes 24 markets. 
16 The most sizeable estimate of the entire population of childcare facilities numbers at 5950 for the year 2004 (CBS statline 
21-11-2006). In comparison, our dataset contains 3701 locations for that same year.   10 
Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of markets have a small number of childcare providers: 
approximately 40% of the markets have only one childcare facility in both periods.
17 Markets 
with five childcare facilities or more account for less then 5% of the sample. In 2006, there are 
slightly more markets with a five childcare facilities or more. 
 
In order to characterise the different markets, we marry the data from the General Firm Registry 
to demographic data on the postal code level of Statistics Netherlands from the year 1999.
18 
Summary statistics are given in table 4.1: 
Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics (per postal code) 
      Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  N 
             
No. of facilities (av. ‘99-’01)  N9901  1.43  1.28  0  12  2468 
No. of facilities ’06   N06  1.57  1.62  0  18  2468 
No. of NFP facilities (av. ’99-’01)  N_NFP9901  1.11  1.13  0  10  2468 
No. of NFP facilities ’06  N_NFP06  0.74  0.65  0  6  2468 
Population (in 10,000)  POP  0.55  0.40  0.01  2.30  2440 
Income p.p. (in €10,000)  INC  2.19  0.30  1.07  4.18  2438 
% Families with child  FAMCHILD  61.63  7.15  32  85  2428 
dummy for “highly” or “very highly” 
urbanised  CITY  0.27  0.44  0  1  2440 
 
The population of an average childcare market equalled 5,500 in 1999. On average, the per 
capita income was approximately €22,000. About 62% of all families had at least one child. 




Table 4.1 signals two important trends in the provision of childcare in the Netherlands:  
1.  There has been growth in the total number of childcare facilities in our sample. On average 
there were 1.4 childcare facilities per market in the period 1999-2001 against 1.6 in 2006. In 
total, the number of childcare facilities has increased from approximately 3,550 in the period 
1999-2001 to around 3,900 in 2006: an increase of approximately 10%. That there has been 
 
17 Note that in this figure there are markets with zero childcare facilities. These are markets that have no facility in 1999-
2001 but at least one facility in 2006 and vice versa. Recall that markets with no childcare facilities in both periods are 
excluded from the sample. 
18 Kerncijfers viercijferige postcodegebieden 1999. Data from the year 2003 were available to us, but we restrict ourselves to 
using the 1999 data as they were found to be more complete. We observed very little variation in demographic data between 
1999 and 2003, such that this restriction should not affect the results. 
19 The degree of urbanisation is derived from the surrounding address density, so the value of the dummy equals 1 if the 
surrounding address density is more than or equal to 1500 surrounding addresses per km
2. Of all postal codes (including 
those without provision) around 20% fall into this category.   11 
growth in childcare provision is corroborated by data from the Network bureau Expansion 
Childcare
20 and Statistics Netherlands;
21 
2.  Both the number and share of facilities that are run on a NFP basis has declined. While in the 
period 1999-2001 approximately 80% of all locations were run on a NFP basis, this number has 
fallen to just short of 50% in 2006. Vice versa, the share of FP childcare facilities has increased. 
The total number of NFP childcare facilities has fallen from over 2700 in the period 1999-2001 
to about 1800 in 2006.  
 
Table 4.2 shows that growth has not been evenly spread over different markets: whereas 
approximately 25% of all markets showed no change in the number of childcare facilities, 35% 
showed an increase in the number of childcare facilities and 40% showed a decline. Among the 
markets with only one childcare facility in 1999, 80% experienced no variation or a decline, 
while only 20% experienced growth in the number of childcare facilities. The table also gives 
some characteristics of the markets. It shows that growth has predominantly occurred in 
markets with above average population, income and urbanisation. 
Table 4.2  Descriptive statistics of markets with a decline, growth or no change in the number of childcare 
facilities 
  Decline    No change    Growth 
  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Median  N    Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Median  N    Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Median  N 
                             
POP  0.47  0.37  0.38  933    0.52  0.37  0.45  616    0.66  0.43  0.64  891 
INC  2.15  0.28  2.12  932    2.20  0.28  2.16  615    2.23  0.32  2.17  891 
CITY  0.14  0.35  0  933    0.24  0.43  0  616    0.41  0.49  0  891 
 
Equally, the fall in the number of NFP childcare facilities has not been spread evenly over 
different markets either. Figure 4.2 shows the number of markets that have experienced either a 
decline, growth or no change in the number of FP respectively NFP childcare facilities. About 
45% of the markets experienced a decline in the number of NFP childcare facilities, 15% 
experienced growth and approximately 40% experienced no change whatsoever. The 
corresponding figures for the number of FP childcare facilities are approximately 10% 
(decline), 40% (growth) and 50% (no change). 
 
20 The Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang was an initiative of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports. One of its 
core tasks was to oversee and keep track of the growth in childcare capacity in the period 2000-2004.  
21 In comparison to the growth reported in other sources, the growth figure in our dataset is relatively modest. Estimates 
from the Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang (2003) show an increase of more than 1200 facilities over the period 
2000 to 2003 and Statistics Netherlands reports an increase of approximately 700 facilities between 2002 and 2004 (Statline 
27-11-2006).   12 
Figure 4.2  The number of markets that have experienced growth, decline or no change in the number of FP 
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One of the most striking features of figure 4.2 is the number of markets that have experienced a 
decline in the number of NFP childcare facilities. In fact, the bulk (i.e. 92%) of the markets 
experiencing a decline in the total number of childcare facilities is formed by markets 
experiencing a decline in the number of NFP facilities. Table 4.3 shows that these markets have 
lower than average income and population and that they are located in areas with a lower than 
average degree of urbanisation.  
Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics of markets with a decline in the number of NFP childcare facilities 
  Mean   St. dev.  Median   N 
         
INC  2.16  0.29  2.13  1151 
POP  0.51  0.38  0.44  1152 
CITY  0.17  0.38  0  1152 
 
In almost 80% of the markets that have experienced a decline in the total provision of childcare, 
the number of NFPs has fallen and the number of FPs has remained constant. More specifically, 
in 95% of these markets, there were no FP childcare facilities in the period 1999-2001 and their 
level remained constant at zero. Apparently, NFPs are exiting markets in which FP childcare 
providers were not active.    13 
5  Empirical results 
Demand factors affecting childcare provision 
Have the factors that determine the level of childcare provision in a market in 2006 changed in 
comparison to the period 1999-2001? In order to address this question, we formulate a simple 
OLS regression model explaining the number of childcare facilities per 10,000 inhabitants by: 
1) The average level of purchasing power (PP); and 2) Demographic characteristics of a market 
(DEMO). We estimate the model separately for the period 1999-2001 and the year 2006. We try 
different specifications, each with a different combination of explanatory variables. As a proxy 
for PP, we in turn use average per capita income, average property value or the percentage of 
low-income. DEMO contains a number of variables that capture the demographic composition 
of the market, such as the percentage of families with children, the percentage of persons under 
the age of 15, average family size. We also include a dummy that indicates whether the market 
is located in a highly or very highly urbanised area. 
 
Table 5.1 presents the OLS estimation results for the two different time periods. It shows that 
the factors explaining the level of childcare provision in the period 1999-2001 do not 
necessarily to the same extent explain the provision of childcare in 2006 and vice versa.  
Table 5.1  OLS estimation results. Dependent variable: The number of childcare facilities per 10,000 
inhabitants 
            1999-2001    2006       
      Coeff.  St. error
1    Coeff.  St. error
1    T-statistic
2  
               
INC  ─ 1.997  0.774    1.289  0.610    3.33 
CITY  ─ 3.714  0.207    ─ 1.757  0.186    7.06 
% FAMCHILD  0.014  0.028    0.053  0.021    1.13 
CONSTANT  9.541  2.521    ─ 1.306  2.259    ─ 3.20 
R
2  0.057      0.020       
N  2428      2428       
1 Standard errors were calculated using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance 
2 Reports the t-statistic on the test for equality of the coefficients of 1999-2001 and 2006 
 
All coefficients are significant at 5%, except for the percentage families with children in 1999. 
The results are fairly robust over different specifications. The difference between the 
coefficients from the period 1999-2001 and 2006 are significant at 1%, except for the 
coefficient of the percentage families with children. The results indicate that a market’s 
purchasing power has become a more important factor in determining in what type of market 
childcare providers locate. In fact, the sign of the coefficient has even reversed. In the period 
1999-2001, if the average income in a market was €5,000 higher meant that there would be one 
less childcare facility per 10.000 persons in the market. In 2006, a similar difference in average   14 
income results in having 0.6 more childcare facilities. In addition, there are relatively more 
childcare locations located in a city in 2006 compared to the period 1999-2001. Whereas in the 
period 1999-2001, being in a city meant that there were almost 4 childcare facilities fewer per 
10,000 persons, this difference has shrunk to almost 2 facilities in 2006.
22  
 
These results tell us that in 2006 the provision of childcare is more responsive to income and 
urbanisation than in 1999-2001. Although other dynamics may have been at play, this is 
consistent with the intuition that the introduction of demand-financing would provide stronger 
incentives for childcare providers to locate in markets with higher levels of purchasing power 
and more urbanised neighbourhoods. These results mirror the descriptive statistics given in 
Section 4, where table 4.2 showed that most of the growth in childcare provision took place in 
neighbourhoods with above average levels of income and urbanisation. Another statistic that 
illustrates this is the partial correlation between the number of locations in a market and 
population size: for the period 1999-2001 it equalled only 0.24, whereas it equalled 0.47 in 
2006. Overall, it seems that the provision of childcare is more responsive to factors driving the 
demand of childcare in 2006 as compared to the period 1999-2001.  
 
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results of a simple probit model, using as independent variable 
a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there has been growth in the total number of 
locations in a market. The probit estimation confirms the previous results. The probability that a 
market has experienced growth in the number of childcare facilities has been higher in areas 
with a higher level of purchasing power and a larger percentage of families with children. In 
addition, the probability of experiencing growth has been higher in markets that were located in 
a city or more generally, in more highly urbanised areas. 
Table 5.2  Probit estimation results. Dependent variable: binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there 
has been growth in the total number of childcare facilities per market 
   dF/dx
1  St. error
2 
     
INC  0.174  0.040 
CITY  0.258  0.023 
FAMCHILD  0.008  0.002 
Pseudo-R
2  0.051    
N  2428    
Observed p  0.402   
1 Marginal effect at the mean. For coefficient city: discrete change in probability
  




22 A possible explanation for the negative sign of the coefficient city is that childcare facilities in a city are larger, i.e. offer 
more childcare places per facility, requiring less facilities to service a market of similar size.    15 
Economically, the most significant coefficients are those for income and the degree of 
urbanisation of a market as they have the largest effect on the probability of a market 
experiencing growth in the level of childcare provision. For example, the probability of a 
market experiencing growth in the number of childcare facilities is about 25% higher if that 
market is located in a city. The story that childcare provision is more attuned to factors driving 
the demand of childcare has both a positive and a negative connotation. On the upside, the 
market seems to be working more efficiently, allocating funds in a way that more appropriately 
fits the needs of consumers. On the downside, the phenomenon that childcare providers focus 
more on richer and more urbanised markets may have negative effects on the accessibility of 
childcare and may therefore raise distributional and social concerns.
23 It is important to note 
that the changes in the regulatory framework are very recent and that the market may still be in 
transition. Possibly, parents in low-income markets have not become fully aware of the new 
possibilities for financial support and have accordingly not adjusted their demand. On the 
supply side too, a further adjustment may be expected. Intuitively, childcare providers may have 
first targeted areas with slightly higher purchasing power where they may be able to offer a 
richer range of services at slightly higher prices. In future, childcare providers may well 
‘rediscover’ areas with lower purchasing power as viable markets for their services. Once they 
do, childcare provision may again experience a shift as demand and supply realign in areas with 
lower purchasing power. 
Market dynamics of FP and NFP childcare provision 
The second question we aim to address is how the pattern of FP and NFP childcare provision 
has changed. Recall from Section 4 that the share and number of NFP providers has fallen quite 
dramatically during this period from roughly 80% to just under 50%. The drop in the number of 
NFP providers has been especially pronounced in markets with no FP provision, suggesting that 
NFPs tend to exit markets that are unattractive to FPs. Keeping these trends in mind, we again 
formulate a simple OLS model explaining the density of FP (respectively NFP) childcare 
provision in a market. It is analogous to the model formulated for the entire market. As 
dependent variables we use the number of FP (respectively NFP) childcare facilities per 10,000 
persons in a market. The explanatory variables are the same as in the analysis above. Table 5.3 




23 The Association of Dutch Municipalities for example raises concerns about the fact that with the introduction of demand 
financing, municipalities lost an instrument for “the realisation of a coherent set of provisions for the young and the execution 
of measures of preventative youth policy” and “Also the establishment of childcare centres is a responsibility of the market. 
Municipalities can stimulate the establishment of childcare centres in certain areas, for example with an establishment 
premium, but if entrepreneurs see too few profit opportunities, municipalities cannot enforce establishment.” See: 
http://www.vng.nl/smartsite.dws?id=59785&ch=DEF   16 
 
Table 5.3  OLS estimation results. Dependent variable: the number of FP respectively NFP childcare 
facilities per 10,000 persons in a market 
Panel A: FP               
  1999-2001         2006       
               
  Coefficient  Standard error
1     Coefficient  Standard error
1     T-statistic
2 
INC  1.295  0.229    1.754  0.478    0.87 
CITY  ─ 0.014  0.092    ─ 0.263  0.146    ─ 1.45 
% FAMCHILD  0.028  0.007    0.041  0.016    0.76 
C  ─ 3.837  0.792    ─ 4.370  1.815    ─ 0.27 
R
2  0.022      0.014       
N  2428      2428       
               
Panel B: NP               
  1999-2001         2006       
  Coefficient.  Standard error
1     Coefficient  Standard error
1     T-statistic
2 
INC  ─ 3.291  0.757    ─ 0.465  0.434    3.24 
CITY  ─ 3.701  0.192    ─ 1.494  0.133    9.42 
% FAMCHILD  ─ 0.014  0.028    0.012  0.016    0.83 
C  13.377  2.475    3.064  1.582    ─ 3.51 
R
2  0.070      0.023       
N  2428      2428       
1 Standard errors were calculated using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance 
2 Reports the t-statistic on the test for equality of the coefficients of 1999-2001 and 2006 
 
For both types of childcare providers, demand factors seem to have grown more important, but 
only for NFP providers has this change been significant. For example, income has become a 
more important determinant (i.e. the coefficient has become larger or less negative). The 
difference is however statistically significant only for NFP provision. Equally, there has been a 
shift in childcare provision away from markets in less urbanised areas towards more urbanised 
areas, which was significant only for NFP providers. The change of importance is striking: 
whereas in the period 1999-2001 being located outside of a city meant that a market had about 
3.5 locations more per 10,000 inhabitants, this difference has been reduced to 1.5 in 2006. The 
presence of families with children has not become significantly more important to either type of 
childcare provider. The biggest change therefore has occurred in the childcare provision by NFP 
facilities that are still active in 2006. This provision seems to have become significantly more 
responsive to factors driving the demand for childcare, specifically income and urbanisation. 
 
 
   17 
Recall from section 4 that the greatest change in the NFP childcare provision has been a retreat 
from markets with no FP childcare provision. Table 5.4 shows the results of a probit regression 
using as dependent variable a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the market has 
experienced a decline in the number of NFP childcare facilities. 
Table 5.4  Probit estimation results. Dependent variable: binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the 
number of NFP facilities in a market has decreased 
   dF/dx  St.dev 
     
INC  ─ 0.129  0.041 
CITY  ─ 0.213  0.022 
% FAMCHILD  ─ 0.004  0.002 
pseudo-R
2  0.032   
N  2428   
Observed p  0.472   
1 Marginal effect at the mean. For coefficient city: discrete change in probability
  
2 Standard errors were calculated using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance
  
 
Table 5.4 shows that the probability of a market experiencing a decline in the number of NFP 
childcare facilities is higher for areas with lower income, a lower percentage of families with 
children and with a lower degree of urbanisation. If a market is located in a city for example, 
there is a more than 20% lower probability of having experienced a decline in the number of 
NFP childcare providers.  
 
The table seems to confirm that NFP childcare providers have mostly exited markets where 
demand factors were less favourable, i.e. markets with lower average income and less urbanised 
markets. Again, although other factors may have contributed to this development, a possible 
explanation is that in as far as NFP childcare facilities were the favoured recipients of municipal 
subsidies, they lost an important source of income, especially in less profitable markets, when 
these subsidies were removed in the 2005 Childcare Act. Having now to rely solely on income 
generated from their contracts with parents rather than a steady stream of municipal subsidies, 
they would have had to leave markets where demand is not sufficiently high. This suggests that 
the underlying differences between NFP and FP childcare providers are not very significant. On 
a level playing field (i.e. in the absence of municipal subsidies), neither type of childcare 
provider appears to be able to sustain operation in these markets.   18 
6  Conclusion & policy implications 
The market for childcare in the Netherlands has proven very dynamic over the last decade. Most 
importantly, the legislative environment of the Dutch childcare market changed significantly 
with the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act. This act attributed greater importance to the 
demand for childcare from parents by introducing a fully demand-financed system. This was 
expected to influence the provision of childcare as “entrepreneurs would better anticipate the 
demand of parents” and result in a “better balance between demand and supply”.
24  
 
We compare the provision of childcare under the old regime (in the period 1999-2001) with the 
provision of childcare after the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act (in 2006). We find that 
the provision of childcare is more sensitive to demand factors, specifically income and 
urbanisation. Compared to the period 1999-2001, the provision of childcare in 2006 has shifted 
towards areas with higher purchasing power and away from less urbanised areas. This finding 
can be interpreted in both a positive and negative manner. In a positive light, they indicate that 
there is a more efficient interplay between supply and demand on the Dutch market for 
childcare. In a negative light, this finding seems to substantiate concerns that existed prior to the 
introduction of the act that the new financing system might cause childcare providers to focus 
on high-income and more urban markets in favour of low-income or more remote markets. This 
conclusion however cannot be drawn on the basis of our findings. Other factors may have 
influenced the provision of childcare. In addition, the reform is of a very recent date. Supply 
and demand may not have fully adjusted to the new regulatory framework.  
 
We also analyse changes in the provision of childcare by NFP and FP childcare providers over 
the same time period. We find that 1) FPs account for a larger number and share of all childcare 
facilities in 2006; and 2) the fall in the provision of childcare by NFP facilities has been 
especially pronounced in areas that had no FP childcare provision prior to the regime change. A 
possible explanation for these results is that under the regime prior to the introduction of the 
2005 Childcare Act, NFP providers may have more frequently been granted municipal 
subsidies. If so, the removal of these subsidies under the 2005 Childcare Act levelled the 
playing field between FP and NFP providers. As neither type of childcare provider is active in 
these markets in the absence of subsidies, the findings suggest that the de facto differences 
between FP and NFP providers are small. The policy implication is that generic policies appear 
more appropriate than policy instruments specifically targeting NFP childcare providers. For 
example, the government may stimulate the provision of childcare in certain areas or for certain 
 
24 Regeling met betrekking tot tegemoetkomingen in de kosten van kinderopvang en waarborging van de kwaliteit van 
kinderopvang (Wet basisvoorziening kinderopvang) - Memorie van toelichting. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 
Kamerstuk 28447, nr. 3, p.16.   19 
target groups if it feels that the accessibility of childcare is in insufficiently warranted, rather 
than promoting NFP providers as an indirect means of increasing accessibility for these groups 
or in these areas. 
 
For a full comparison of the behaviour and performance of FP and NFP childcare providers in 
the Netherlands, it is essential to analyse whether they provide the same quality of service at the 
same prices. Interesting fields for further research are the effect of the 2005 Childcare Act on 
the prices and quality of childcare. Has the change in the composition of Dutch childcare 
provision in favour of FP childcare providers led to a different price-quality ratio? 
Unfortunately, information on the quality, quantity or prices of Dutch childcare is not 
necessarily publicly available. This information is imperative for any substantial policy 
evaluation and the authors would like to stress the importance of this information becoming 
publicly available.  
   20 
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Appendix 
NFP vs. FP: Who should provide childcare? A literature 
review 
The Market and where it fails in childcare 
As noted in the main text, a number of public concerns are invested in the provision of 
accessible and high-quality childcare. Unfortunately, our ability to observe the quality of 
childcare are generally limited as the primary recipients of the service are young children that 
lack the ability to fully asses and communicate shortcomings in quality. Even though parents 
and governments have a great interest in and will exert a great deal of effort in obtaining 
information about the quality of the childcare service (e.g. though inspections, onsite visits, 
parental involvement and reputation mechanisms), fact remains: parents and government simply 
cannot be present full-time while the service is being rendered and therefore a residual 
informational deficit or asymmetry will remain. Mocan (2001) finds some evidence for the 
presence of information asymmetries in the childcare sector by comparing the parents’ 
valuation of the quality of childcare to the valuation of professional observers.
25 In this situation 
of asymmetric information, there is an incentive for providers of childcare to spend less effort 
on hard-to-observe quality, such as direct teacher-child interaction, in order to cut costs and 
enhance profits. This phenomenon is denoted as moral hazard (see e.g. Hansman (1980)).  
 
Another concern is the fact that the childcare market is a local market: Parents using childcare 
are almost by definition time-constrained and do not want to travel far and wide to drop off 
their children at the childcare centre. The inherent danger is that in small isolated areas there is 
enough demand only to sustain one supplier who will have considerable market power. In this 
situation, this supplier has an incentive to raise prices, produce less and lower quality. This 
could result in a situation in which childcare either becomes inaccessible (too expensive) or 
unattractive (inferior quality) to parents, limiting their possibilities to enter the labour market. 
There is some evidence of this phenomenon for the hospital industry. Abraham et al. (2003) 
find that in local hospital markets, one extra entrant results in an increase in competition, 
quantity produced and consumption to the benefit of the consumer.  
 
Informational problems and monopoly power are the two principal reasons why many 
governments have been hesitant to allow private FP provision of childcare and have instead 
 
25 In a survey of Dutch parents using childcare, Kok et al (2005) report that 63% of parents indicate that they have sufficient 
information to make a well-informed choice between different day-care centres. The results show that the extent of the 
information problems vary between different modes of childcare, as the corresponding percentages are 59% for out-of-shool 
care, 86% for family day-care, 76% for paid informal care and 89% for unpaid informal care.   24 
opted for public provision so as to guarantee the highest possible level of control over quality, 
affordability and accessibility. Often cited disadvantages of public provision however are 
inefficiencies, shortage of innovation and a lack of responsiveness to the needs of consumers 
(i.e. as public organisations take directions from government officials rather than responding 
directly to demand, a distance to consumers may result). There is a third option which 
resembles a middle ground between private FP and public provision: private NFP provision. 
Lacking a profit motive: an effective armour against market failures? 
“Theory” 
So is there any theoretical evidence that private NFP childcare providers are better armed 
against the failings of both the market and the public sector? Like FP providers, NFPs are 
private firms and therefore must obey the rule of the market. As a result, unlike in a public 
organisation, the distance to the consumer tends to remain rather small. In contrast to private FP 
providers however, NFPs are not confined by the objective to make a profit. The defining 
difference between NFP and FP organisations is that the former is governed by a non-
distribution constraint. Grout and Yong (2003) define it as the injunction on NFPs “to distribute 
any ‘profit’ or residual element to anyone who is able to exercise control or direct influence 
over the entity.”
26 Instead, any ‘profit’ must be invested in the spirit of the NFP’s mission (see 
also Hansmann (1980) and Glaeser (2002)).  
Advantages 
Since there is no direct outlet (such as shareholders or owners) for rents and surpluses that may 
be generated in the operation of the firm, there should in theory also be less incentive to 
generate such additional surpluses or rents for example by skimping on difficult-to-observe 
quality or exploiting monopoly power. Moreover, NFPs may be able to enter markets that are 
unattractive to FP providers, for example in remote or poor areas. 
 
Labelling this feature a constraint possibly lends it too negative a connotation, for in fact it 
provides NFPs with a potentially important additional benefit. Employees in a NFP organisation 
will be more willing to donate labour (provide more effort than contractually agreed, e.g. by 
working unpaid overtime) as the non-distribution constraint implicitly guarantees that any 
additional rents generated by their donation will not accrue to shareholders but to the cause that 
inspired their donation in the first place: the well-being of the children in their care. By a similar 
argument, NFPs may be able to attract more volunteers, tax credits, subsidies and donations of 
another (e.g. monetary) kind. 
 
26 Grout and Yong (2003), p.2.   25 
Disadvantages 
So NFPs are ideal: they don’t skimp, exploit monopoly power and get the best out of their 
employees? Unfortunately no. NFPs suffer from a number of disadvantages that are recognised 
by the theoretical literature. Firstly, as there are no shareholders demanding profits and 
administrating financial prudence, there may be more room for inefficiencies in NFP 
organisations. Secondly, other forms of rent seeking behaviour may arise in NFP organisations. 
For example, NFP managers (unchecked by shareholders) may award themselves elaborate 
perquisites. Finally, the mechanism allowing NFPs to attract (labour) donations may become 
compromised if its mission is too vaguely formulated or if the first two drawbacks materialise. 
In short, there is theoretical potential for NFPs to outperform private FPs, but whether this 
occurs in practice remains an empirical matter.  
Empirics  
We will give an overview of the empirical evidence of the relative performance of NFPs vis-à-
vis FPs on four performance indicators: Quality, Accessibility, Wages and Efficiency. A word 
of caution is appropriate here: There are only few countries that allow the provision of childcare 
by FP providers. This means that the empirical literature consists almost exclusively of studies 
using US or Canadian data. In addition, legislation of childcare and the regulatory attitude vis-à-
vis FP providers often differs considerably between states or provinces, making it difficult to 
draw universal conclusions from the current state of empirical literature.  
Advantages 
Regarding the potential advantage of NFP providers on quality, the empirical evidence is 
mostly inconclusive. The economic literature distinguishes between three concepts of quality
27 
represented in figure A.1: 1) quality in inputs, denoted as structural quality, which for example 
concerns the quality of furnishings and is generally easy to observe and regulate; 2) process 
quality, reflecting for example the quality of teacher-child interaction, which is more difficult to 
observe;
28 and 3) quality in child outcomes, which represents the contribution of the childcare 
provider in the emotional, social and cognitive development of the child. This last concept of 
quality is most difficult to observe and measure.  
 
 
27 We are indebted to F.Kool from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for providing an earlier version of this figure. 
28 Another important difference between structural and process quality is in whose sphere of control the decisions regarding 
the quality effort ultimately lie. Whereas structural quality is decided upon by the childcare manager, teachers chiefly control 
the level of process quality. In a NFP facility, process quality may therefore be higher as teachers feel encouraged to provide 
extra effort on process quality as any additional rents from this effort will be reinvested (see the discussion on donated 
labour).   26 
Figure A.1  A diagram of the childcare production process and the various concepts of childcare quality 
Phase of ‘production’  Input  Throughput  Output 
       
  Structural quality  Process quality  Quality in child outcomes 
       
e.g.:  - child/teacher ratio  - child/teacher interaction  - cognitive and social skills 
  - group size  - creative stimulation   
  - space/furnishings     
       
Observable:   Easy  More difficult  Difficult 
 
Following the discussion on the theoretical basis of a potential NFP differential, we expect 
NFPs to outperform FPs, especially so on hard-to-observe aspects of quality, i.e. process quality 
and quality in child outcomes. Contrary to this intuition, the empirical literature finds that the 
only aspect of quality in which NFPs on average outperform FPs is structural quality (e.g. 
Mukerjee et al. (1990), Whitebook et al (1990), Mocan (1995) and Sundell (2000)). The 
evidence of a positive NFP differential with respect to structural quality is however not based 
on a very sound footing, as studies generally content with reporting the mean value of indicators 
of structural quality, such as child-teacher ratios and do not correct for other centre 
characteristics such as the age of the centre or the region in which the centre is located. With 
respect to more difficult to observe quality, any evidence of a positive NFP differential is not 
robust. Whereas Canadian studies tend to report a significant positive NFP differential in 
process quality (Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004) and Japel et al. (2005)), the most recent and 
comprehensive US study does not (Morris and Helburn (2000) and Blau and Mocan (2002)). 
This study only finds a significant NFP differential in a state with a relatively lax regulatory 
framework with respect to childcare.
29 Moreover, one study that specifically analyzes the 
phenomenon of skimping on difficult-to-observe quality relative to easy-to-observe quality
30, 
i.e. Mocan (2001) finds evidence of this behaviour in NFP(!) childcare facilities and not in FP 
centres as we might expect. Morris and Helburn (2000) find that whereas the difference 
between NFP and FP organisations may not necessarily be significant, there may be significant 
differences within NFP (or FP) organisations per se, e.g. NFP organisations belonging to a 
chain or church-affiliated NFPs may provide significantly different quality than those that 
operate independently. Cleveland and Krashinsky (2005) show that the degree of competition in 
the market partly determines the extent to which NFP childcare organisations are able to behave 
differently compared to their FP equivalents in the provision of process quality. They show that 
a NFP advantage only materialises in what they coin ‘thick markets’ (i.e. markets with high 
 
29 The authors term this ‘opportunistic skimping’ (see Morris and Helburn (2000), p.386), i.e. there are more opportunities for 
skimping on childcare quality in regions where the government has a smaller regulatory hold on childcare providers. 
30 This behaviour is referred to as a problem of ‘moral hazard’. Providers exploit the informational advantage they have vis-
à-vis consumers by offering high quality in observable dimensions of the service to draw in customers while skimping on 
quality that consumers cannot observe in order to raise profits.   27 
demand for childcare) and not in ‘thin markets’ (i.e. with low demand).
31 They hypothesise that 
in thin markets, market forces drive NFP organisations to behave more like commercial 
childcare centres as all producers are forced to produce relatively low quality care at low prices. 
By contrast, the higher demand in ‘thick markets’ provides opportunities for quality 
differentiation and NFP organisations are able to concentrate on producing high-quality 
childcare. With respect to quality in child outcomes, the only available study known to us by 
Sundell (2000) finds no significant differences in child outcomes between NFP and FP 
childcare providers.  
  
The empirical evidence on another potential advantage of NFP organisations, namely that they 
serve more ‘unprofitable’ markets is slightly stronger. Many studies find that NFPs on average 
serve more low-income families ((Krashinsky (2005), Whitebook et al (1990), Morris and 
Helburn (2000) and Blau and Mocan (2002)). However, most studies also report that NFPs on 
average receive more public funding, so this behaviour may be caused by active government 
policy rather than a difference in institutional design (i.e. the non-distribution constraint). 
Whitebook et al. (1990) find that both children from low-income families and from high-
income families are more likely to attend NFP centres than middle-income families. A possible 
explanation for the fact that children from high-income families more frequently attend NFP 
facilities is the higher average quality offered there. High-income families displayed the highest 
willingness-to-pay, followed by low-income families (!) and middle-income families. Some 
contradictory evidence is given in Japel et al (2005) who find that children with a less 
favourable socio-economic background are more likely to attend FP childcare centres. 
Notwithstanding, they also find that in FP centres the quality of service varies with the socio-
economic status of its clientele (i.e. children from low-income families received the lowest 
quality of care and children from high-income families receive a higher quality of care), 
whereas the quality level is constant over socio-economic status in NFP centres.
32 This lends 
credence to the idea that NFPs are less likely to compromise on quality when faced with a less 
affluent clientele.  
Disadvantages 
In terms of overall efficiency, NFPs are not found to be significantly different from FP 
childcare providers. Whereas some older studies find that the average costs in FP centres are 
lower than in NFP centres (Mukerjee et al.(1990) and Powell and Cosgrove (1992)), more 
recent studies that incorporate a larger array of control variables (most importantly indicators of 
 
31 “Thick markets” are defined as markets with at least 25,000 children from 0-4 years. “Thin markets” are defined as 
markets with fewer than 15,000 children in this age bracket. 
32 Interestingly, Japel et al (2006) is the only study to find that children from a less favourable socio-economic background 
are more likely to attend FP(!) childcare centres.   28 
process quality) find no significant cost or efficiency differential (Mocan (19995) and Blau and 
Mocan (2002)). 
 
Evidence that NFPs are susceptible to other forms of rent-seeking behaviour is found in the 
analysis of wage differentials between NFP and FP childcare providers. Without exception, 
studies on the childcare sector seem to find that NFP organisations on average pay higher wages 
than FP organisations (e.g. Mukerjee et al.(1990), Whitebook et al. (1990), Blau and Mocan 
(2002) and Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004)). Two studies find that the preferential treatment 
of NFP workers extends to other forms of compensation: Mocan and Terkin (2000) find that 
total compensation, including non-wage benefits, on average is higher in NFP childcare 
organsiations than in FPs and Whitebook et al. (1990) observe that NFP centres also offer better 
employment benefits. Rather than a sign of inefficiency, this differential might however be 
explained from an efficiency wage perspective: Having a preference for quality rather than 
profits, NFP may offer higher wages in order to attract and keep better qualified staff.
33 The 
evidence on this is contradictory. On the one hand, a number of studies indeed find that NFP 
childcare organisations on average employ workers with higher levels of experience, education 
and training (Whitebook et al. (1990), Mocan (1995), Mitchell (2002), Cleveland and 
Krashinsky (2004)). Equally, they seem to be able to retain these employees longer, as average 
tenure levels are higher in NFP organisations and average turnover rates are lower. On the other 
hand, a number of studies that have estimated wage equations, correcting for factors such 
teacher experience and education, still find a significant positive NFP wage differential (Preston 
(1998), Leete (2001), Mocan and Terkin (2000) and Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004)). Yet 
again, Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004) find that when controlling for the level of process 
quality offered in the centre and the interaction between the NFP-status and the level of quality 
offered, i.e. the fact that a NFP worker receives a higher reward (in terms of wages) in return 
for an equal increase in quality, the independent effect of the NFP-status on wages disappears.
34 
This last finding again lends credence to the efficiency wage interpretation. A number of studies 
point out that the positive wage differential does not apply to all groups of workers equally. For 
example, Mocan (1995) finds that it only applies to highly educated workers and Mocan and 
Terkin (2000) observe that the positive NFP wage differential is higher for part-time work 
compared to full-time work. Finally, Preston (1988) finds that the stringency of the regulatory 
framework partly determines whether a positive NFP wage differential arises. She finds no pay 
differential in the segment of the childcare market that is governed by relatively lax laws on 
 
33 Indeed, a number of studies find that NFP childcare organisations on average employ workers with higher levels of 
experience, education and training (Whitebook et al (1990), Mocan (1995), Mitchell (2002), Cleveland and Krashinsky 
(2004)). 
34 The authors refer to this regression as a “human-capital” wage regression, which includes a cross-term of the average 
process quality offered by the centre and the NFP status.   29 
childcare quality, while she finds a positive pay differential in the segment that is governed by 
more stringent regulation.
35 The intuition is that the stringent regulation impedes competition, 
allowing NFP childcare providers to behave differently from their profit-maximising 
counterparts by offering higher wages. 
  
The positive NFP wage differential seems to contradict the presence of donated labour in NFP 
childcare organisations, as we would expect employees in NFPs to be willing to work for wages 
below the market rate. However, Mocan and Tekin (2000) find some evidence supportive of the 
labour donation hypothesis. Their dataset includes a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether it was ‘a need to do an important job’ (and thus an altruistic motive) that primarily 
governed employees’ decision to accept their current position. The coefficient of this variable in 
a wage regression was significantly negative for NFP jobs (suggesting that these NFP 
employees are willing to work against a lower wage in line with the donated labour hypothesis) 
and significantly positive for full-time FP jobs. 
Summarising 
Although there are theoretical reasons for assuming NFP childcare organisations may behave 
differently from their FP counterparts, the empirical evidence for any diverging behaviour, 
summed up in table A.1, is very slim.  
Table A.2  Summary of empirical NFP differential 
Performance indicator 
 
Evidence of NFP differential? 
Structural quality  Possibly positive NFP differential 
Process quality  No 
Quality in child outcomes  No 
Accessibility  Possibly positive NFP differential 
Efficiency  No 
Treatment of employees  Positive NFP differential 
 
There is no conclusive evidence that NFPs provide higher overall quality. Although there are 
some indications of a positive NFP differential with respect to structural quality, more research 
is required as most analyses content with reporting the difference in the mean value and do not 
control for other relevant factors, such as the centre age or the region in which the centre is 
located. The evidence of a NFP differential on process quality seems region-specific, as most 
 
35 In her estimates, Preston (1988) does not correct for differences in process quality. She does however correct for 
structural quality in the form of the child-to-staff ratio.   30 
Canadian studies seem to find a positive differential, while the most recent US studies do not. 
No definite conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. The same holds true for differences in 
the quality of child outcomes. The only study known to us does not find a NFP differential. 
There are indications that NFPs are more inclined to serve less profitable segments of the 
market or are at least not inclined to skimp on quality when faced with a less affluent clientele, 
but the amount of studies dedicated to this subject is small and again more research is required. 
The most recent studies investigating differences in the efficiency of NFP and FP organisations, 
find no significant differential. Finally, there is some evidence that NFPs behave differently in 
the treatment of their employees, but this may be interpreted in contradictory ways: in a positive 
light it can be seen as evidence of NFP’s preference for quality and in a negative light it may be 
interpreted as proof of NFP’s inefficiencies.  
 
The degree of competition that exists in the market may be important, as it appears to affect the 
extent to which NFPs can behave differently from FPs (Cleveland and Krashinsky (2005) and 
Preston (1988)). While this is an important caveat to bear in mind, more research into this 
relation is necessary before it can be used in policy design. 
 
So who should provide childcare: NFPs or FPs? and should NFPs receive preferential treatment 
from the government? While theoretically there may be reasons to suppose that NFPs have a 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis FPs in combating market failures, the current empirical 
literature does not observe stark differences in the performance of NFP and FP childcare 
organisations and therefore does not seem to warrant such favourable treatment.  